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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In July, 2010, a federal court in Massachusetts held 
unconstitutional the provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) that denies all federal benefits to same-sex spouses.  The ruling 
relied on two arguments: that the law interfered with the rights of states 
guaranteed in the 10th Amendment, and that it violated the Constitution’s 
equal protection clause.  The first of these arguments doesn’t make much 
sense, but the second, which had also persuaded two Ninth Circuit judges, 
is so strong that it has a good chance of being accepted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
 The equal protection claim is that DOMA lacks a rational basis 
because it reflects a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.  The 
argument has real bite, and it bites much harder now than it did in 1996, 
when DOMA was passed by overwhelming margins in both houses of 
Congress.1  President Bill Clinton felt that he had no alternative but to 
hold his nose and sign the bill.
2
  As this is written, another Democratic 
President, Barack Obama, has openly called for its repeal.
3
 
This growing success is a window into the hidden cultural roots of 
law.  It reveals the normative premises of rational basis analysis, at least 
                     
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern 
University.  Thanks to Martha Nussbaum and to audiences at the Symposium on DOMA 
Issues Concerning Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 
California Western School of Law, and at the Drake Constitutional Law Center 2010 
Symposium for helpful discussion, and to Marcia Lehr for research assistance. 
1
 The bill passed the House by a vote of 342–67 on July 12, 1996.  142 CONG. REC. 
H7505–06 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).  It passed the Senate by a vote of 85–14 on 
September 10, 1996.  142 CONG. REC. 22466–67 (1996). 
2
 The President signed the bill at 12:50 a.m. on September 21, 1996.  Peter Baker, 
President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at 
A21. 
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whenever that analysis is used to invalidate a statute.  The country’s 
attitudes toward gay people have evolved rapidly, to the point where this 
kind of lashing out at gays looks a lot less attractive than it did only a 
decade ago.  In 1996, otherwise reasonable people thought it a pointless 
waste of taxpayer dollars to look after the basic needs of gay couples and 
their families.  This attitude was so pervasive that I myself was reluctantly 
convinced that the part of the statute denying federal benefits would 
survive rational basis challenge.  That callousness no longer looks so 
rational, and increasing numbers are ready to recognize gay relationships.   
The burden of proof now lies on those who want to defend this 
discrimination.  It has become increasingly difficult to articulate a sensible 
basis for this discrimination.  The shift is really one of normative 
priorities.  The invocation of “rationality” masks the processes that are 
actually at work.   
This shift has implications for the choice of law problem, the 
question of what happens when same-sex marriages cross state lines.  
Choice of law analysis depends on the balancing of the legitimate interests 
of different states in applying their own laws to a given transaction.  The 
interest balancing exercise obviously will come out differently if some 
interests disappear from view.  As the arguments against same-sex 
marriage become increasingly antiquated, the choice of law problem will 
gradually – I emphasize gradually - disappear. 
Part I of this Article explores the doubts that have been expressed 
about DOMA’s constitutionality, and elucidates its basis.  Part II examines 
DOMA’s origins and meanings, and reviews a plausible argument for its 
constitutionality – an argument that once worried me, much more than it 
does now.  Part III examines the changing cultural context within which 
legal analysis takes place.  Part IV shows how constitutional law is 
dependent on its cultural context.  Part V examines a neglected argument 
for the unconstitutionality of DOMA:  the fact that the statute overtly 
discriminates on the basis of sex.  The conclusion considers the 
implications of the analysis for choice of law. 
 
II.  THE NEW DOUBTS ABOUT DOMA 
 
 Section 3 of DOMA requires that marriage, for all federal 
purposes, must be defined as the union of one man and one woman.  It 
was challenged by the Attorney General in Massachusetts, where same-
sex marriage is legal, and also in a separate suit, by Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) on behalf of seven married same-sex 
couples and three widowers in the state who had been in same-sex 
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marriages. The plaintiffs included the surviving spouse of Rep. Gerry 
Studds (D-Mass.),. After Studds’ death, his spouse was denied both health 
insurance and the normal survivor annuity – the only widower of a 
member of Congress to be refused these benefits.  One of the plaintiffs in 
the GLAD lawsuit is a police officer whose family would receive no 
benefits, including the education benefit for surviving spouses, if she were 
killed in the line of duty.4  The surviving spouse of Representative Gerry 
Studds, the first openly gay man to serve in Congress, was denied both 
health insurance and the normal survivor annuity—the only widower of a 
member of Congress to be refused these benefits. 5  Several are retired and 
do not have the Social Security benefits they would have received if their 
spouse were of the opposite sex.
6
 
 In the case brought by Massachusetts, District Judge Joseph Tauro 
held that DOMA intrudes on “traditional government functions,” 
specifically the state’s right to define what marriage is.7  In the 
individuals’ cases, it held that there is no rational basis for denying federal 
benefits to same sex spouses in marriages legally recognized in their 
states.8  The first of these arguments is silly, and potentially mischievous.  
But the second is very strong, and can and should carry the day if, as is 
likely, the case is appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. 
 The trouble with the states’ rights argument is its implication that 
whenever a federal law uses the word “marriage” to define the scope of 
some federal program, it is obligated to follow state law.  But an obvious 
counterexample exists: immigration.  In most states, the government 
doesn’t involve itself in the reasons a couple marries, even if there’s no 
love involved and the marriage is primarily a business transaction or a 
matter of convenience. But when people marry for immigration purposes, 
the federal government has no trouble deeming the marriage “fraudulent,” 
even though it remains valid under state law.  The Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agency doesn’t interfere with traditional state 
functions, because it leaves the state free to recognize, for its own 
                     
4 Complaint app. at 6, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 1:09-cv-10309 (D. Mass. July 
31, 2009), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-complaint-03-03-
09.pdf.     
5 Id. at 27-34.  
6
 Id. at 69–70. 




purposes, any marriage it likes. But it won’t grant legal residency to 
immigrants it believes married only to secure the benefit. 
 The other part of the court’s ruling, however, held that DOMA 
lacked a rational basis, because none of the government’s justifications for 
the law’s blanket discrimination made sense.  This same argument had 
previously persuaded two Ninth Circuit judges. 
 More than a year earlier, in January and February 2009, Judges 
Alex Kozinski and Stephen Reinhardt, each acting in their capacity as 
administrators of the courts, declared that DOMA does not preclude the 
extension of federal insurance benefits to the same-sex spouses of court 
employees.  Kozinski avoided the constitutional issue—which he thought 
was a serious problem—by construing DOMA not to preclude the 
extension of benefits.9  Reinhardt thought that DOMA does block such 
benefits, and concluded that it was therefore unconstitutional.10  Until 
then, no federal judge had questioned the constitutionality of DOMA.11  
Decisions by two such respected judges, widely separated on the political 
spectrum—Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, is a Reagan appointee who 
often speaks to the Federalist society, and Judge Reinhardt has been called 
the most liberal judge on the liberal Ninth Circuit—had powerful 
persuasive authority. 
What is the basis of this doubt about the statute’s constitutionality? 
Start with some basic constitutional law.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
provides in pertinent part that no state may “deny to any person . . . the 
equal protection of the laws.”12  On this basis, the Court has struck down 
                     
9
 See In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2009);  see also In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 
956, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (awarding Golinski relief under the Back Pay Act, entitling 
her to damages equal to the amount of benefits she would have received).   
10
 See In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009);  see also In re  Levenson, 
587 F.3d 925, 934–38 (9th Cir. 2009) (awarding  Levenson monetary relief under the 
Back Pay Act).  As this is written, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is 
resisting the judges’ orders and disputing their authority to make them.  See Joe 
Davidson, OPM Defies Order on Same-Sex Benefits, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A17, 
available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/21/AR2009122103240.html.   
11
 There were a few earlier cases in which DOMA’s constitutionality was challenged, but 
they were uniformly unsuccessful.  Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683–86 
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 959 (2006); Matthews v. Gonzales, 171 Fed. 
Appx. 120, 122  (9th Cir. 2006); Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 
2d 1239, 1251–53 (N.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d in part, 333 Fed. Appx. 361 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305–09 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 
123, 130–48 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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laws that impose certain inequalities, such as the race discrimination that 
was challenged in Brown v. Board of Education.13  But it does not make 
sense to condemn all inequalities imposed by the law.  All laws classify—
and in that way make some citizens unequal to others.  A law that forbids 
10-year-olds from driving or voting treats them unequally from those who 
are permitted to do these things.  For this reason, with respect to laws that 
do not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or a few other “suspect 
classifications,” the constitutional test is what is called rational basis 
review:  the law will be upheld in court if it is “rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”14 
In a few “rare and exceptional cases,” however, the Court has used 
the rational basis test to strike down laws. 15  In these cases, the Court 
deploys what scholars have called “rational basis with bite,” to distinguish 
it from the toothless test that is ordinarily applied. 16  It is this line of 
cases that the two Ninth Circuit judges were relying upon. 
 It is not always clear what the basis is for this greater severity of 
scrutiny.  One line of decisions offers an explanation.  These are the cases 
that hold that a law is unconstitutional if it reflects a bare desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group.  The first of these is USDA v. Moreno.17  It 
invalidated a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act that excluded from 
participation in the food stamp program any member of a household 
whose members are not all related to each other.18  Congress, the 
legislative history showed, was attempting to prevent “hippie communes” 
from receiving any stamps.19  The Court held that this purpose was fatal 
to the statute:  “[I]f the constitutional concept of ‘equal protection of the 
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”20  The law in Moreno had 
                     
13
 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954). 
14 New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
15 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 689 (3d ed. 
2006). 
16 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–24 (1972); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 680 (citing Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in the Structure:  
The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984)). 
17
 USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).   
18
 Id. at 529. 
19 Id. at 534. 
20 Id.  
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no purpose other than to keep federal benefits out of the hands of a group 
Congress did not like. 
 Moreno became relevant to the gay rights question in Romer v. 
Evans, which struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution—
referred to on the ballot as “Amendment 2”—declaring that neither the 
state nor any of its subdivisions could prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.” 2122  The Amendment, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court observed, “has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group.”23  The Amendment 
seemed to “deprive[] gays and lesbians even of the protection of general 
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental 
and private settings.”24  The Court concluded that “Amendment 2 
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make 
them unequal to everyone else.”25  Quoting Moreno, it found that the 
broad disability imposed on a targeted group  
raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is 
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.  “[I]f the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”26   
Romer’s holding may thus be summarized:   
[I]f a law targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon 
it disabilities that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no 
discernible relationship to any legitimate governmental interest, 
then the Court will infer that the law’s purpose is simply to harm 
that group, and so will invalidate the law.27 
                     
21 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 345–36 (1996).   
22  Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b). 
23  Id. at 632. 
24
 Id. at 630. 
25
 Id. at 635. 
26
 Id. at 634 (quoting USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
27
 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
LAW 8 (2002); see generally Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 
6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89 (1997). 
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 All three judges relied on this line of cases to hold that DOMA is 
unconstitutionally irrational if it denies benefits to married same-sex 
couples.28 
 Judge Tauro observed that the House report on DOMA identified 
four interests that the statute advanced:  “(1) encouraging responsible 
procreation and child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution 
of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3) defending traditional notions of 
morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources.”29  The first bore no 
rational relationship to DOMA:  children raised by same-sex couples tend 
to turn out just as well as those raised by heterosexuals, and in any case, 
denying benefits to same-sex couples is no help to heterosexual parents.  
Nor can it encourage heterosexual marriage, because “this court cannot 
discern a means by which the federal government's denial of benefits to 
same-sex spouses might encourage homosexual people to marry members 
of the opposite sex.”  After Lawrence, morality is not a sufficient basis for 
a law.30  Finally, “a concern for the preservation of resources standing 
alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those 
resources.” 31  Other justifications proffered by the Justice Department in 
the litigation were equally unavailing.   There was no valid federal interest 
                     
28
 In re  Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 2009). 
29 Gill v. OPM, 2010 WL 2695652. 
30 This is an overreading of Lawrence, which does not stand for such a broad 
proposition.  The better response to this interest was offered by Judge Reinhardt:  
targeting same-sex couples for deprivation of benefits is “far too attenuated” a means to 
the desired end, and “exhibits the ‘bare desire to harm’ same-sex couples that is 
prohibited.”  In re  Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1150. 
31 This argument was relied on heavily by supporters of the measure, though they relied 
on delusional estimates of the cost.  Senator Phil Gramm warned that the “failure to pass 
this bill . . . will create . . . a whole group of new beneficiaries—no one knows what the 
number would be—tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, potentially more—who 
will be beneficiaries of newly-created survivor benefits under Social Security, Federal 
retirement plans, and military retirement plans.”  142 CONG. REC. 22443 (1996) 
(statement of Sen. Gramm).  Senator Robert Byrd said that he did “not think . . . that it is 
inconceivable that the costs associated with such a change could amount to hundreds of 
millions of dollars, if not billions -- if not billions -- of Federal taxpayer dollars.”  142 
CONG. REC. 22448 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 
 As it turns out, the fiscal consideration cuts the other way:  federal recognition 
of same-sex marriage would produce a modest increase in federal revenue, amounting to 
a bit less than $400 million annually.  See Letter and Report from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 
Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcommittee on the 




in a uniform national definition of marriage, or in preserving the status 
quo of nonrecognition of same-sex relationships. 
 The court followed an earlier Eleventh Circuit concurrence in 
interpreting Romer to hold that “And “when the proffered rationales for a 
law are clearly and manifestly implausible, a reviewing court may infer 
that animus is the only explicable basis. [Because] animus alone cannot 
constitute a legitimate government interest,”32 the court found that 
DOMA lacks a rational basis.  Judge Reinhardt’s opinion followed 
essentially the same reasoning. 
 Kozinski avoided the constitutional issue by construing the 
statute’s restriction of benefits to opposite-sex couples to merely dictate 
minimum requirements for medical plans: 
Under this broader construction, OPM would also be free to 
contract for “family” benefits for individuals who do not qualify as 
spouses under federal law, but who are considered spouses under 
state law. 
Adopting the broader construction of the statute . . . avoids 
difficult constitutional issues.  If I were to interpret the [statute] as 
excluding same-sex spouses, I would first have to decide whether 
such an exclusion furthers a legitimate governmental end.  Because 
mere moral disapproval of homosexual conduct isn’t such an end, 
the answer to this question is at least doubtful.33 
This difficult problem indicated that the statute did not bar the benefits.  
“When a statute admits two constructions, one of which requires a 
decision on a hard question of constitutional law, it has long been our 
practice to prefer the alternative.”34 
 The analogy to the earlier cases makes sense.  DOMA cuts off 
federal benefits to a targeted, politically unpopular group, just like the law 
in Moreno, and it does so in a remarkably broad and undifferentiated way, 
just like the law in Romer.  Some of the government’s rationales for the 
law that were stated in the House Committee Report—“defending 
traditional notions of morality, and preserving scarce government 
resources”35—were presented and rejected in Moreno and Romer. 
                     
32 Quoting Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1280 
(11th Cir.2004) (Birch, J., specially concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(interpreting the mandate of Romer v. Evans). 
33
 In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2009). 
34
 Id. at 904 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–46 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). 
35 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2914. 
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 This line of cases displays the implicit normative premises of 
rational basis analysis.  Moreno and Romer invalidated laws for lacking a 
rational basis, but any statute’s terms suggest a purpose that the statute 
rationally serves.36  A law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on 
Tuesdays is rationally—indeed, perfectly—related to the purpose of 
preventing blue Volkswagens from being driven on Tuesdays.  The real 
issue is whether some goals are impermissible or not worth pursuing, a 
question that cannot be answered on the basis of “rationality.”  It depends 




 What has done the work here is a shift in the culture, so that 
treatment of gay people that seemed reasonable in 1996 no longer seems 
so in 2009.  It also helps that there are specific stories, some of which 
were recounted earlier in this Article,38 of real people who are hurt by 
DOMA.  A policy that might seem sane when stated in the abstract looks 
pretty stupid when applied to actual people. 
 
III. THE PROVENANCE, EFFECT, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DOMA 
 
A. The Origins of DOMA 
 
 The story of how DOMA was enacted has been told before, but it 
is relevant here, so I will review it. 39 
Gay rights advocates were as surprised as everyone else when a 
1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision seemed to indicate that the state 
would shortly have to recognize same-sex marriages.40  The court held that 
the statute discriminated on the basis of sex, and therefore was subject to 




 See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law:  Judicial Review and 
Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1056–57 (1979); Robert Nagel, Note, 
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 124 (1972); 
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 345–47 (1949).   
37
 Bennett, supra note 34, at 1078. 
38 See supra note __. 
39 See Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States:  When Same-Sex Marriages 
Cross State Lines 7–10, 114-36 (2006) [hereinafter Same Sex, Different States]. 
40
 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). 
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strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the state constitution.41  
In order to justify its discrimination against same-sex couples, the court 
held, the state would have to show that the discrimination is necessary for 
a compelling state interest.42  This is a nearly impossible burden to carry, 
so most observers expected that the state would lose at trial—as in fact it 
eventually did.43   
DOMA was a reaction to the Hawaii case.  It declared that no 
same-sex marriage would be recognized for federal purposes, such as 
filing joint tax returns, the award of social security survivor’s benefits, or 
medical insurance for the families of federal employees.44  The Act also 
indicated (here basically restating existing law, though with some 
important and unnoticed modifications) that states were not required to 
recognize marriages from other states when they had strong public policies 
to the contrary.  States also began enacting their own mini-DOMAs, 
declaring that they did indeed have public policies against recognizing 
same-sex marriages valid in other states.45 
 As it turned out, Hawaii never recognized same-sex marriage.  
While Baehr v. Miike was still being appealed, a state constitutional 
amendment was adopted, giving the legislature the right to reserve 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.46   
Other states, however, soon moved toward recognition of same-sex 
couples.  In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court declared that gay couples 
were entitled under the state constitution to the same legal rights as 
married heterosexual couples.47  The state constitution’s “common 
benefits” clause, which required that government benefits be shared 
equally by the entire community, required that gay people not be excluded 
from legal benefits and protections available to heterosexuals.48  The 
                     
41
 Id. at 67. 
42
 Id.  
43
 See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1996) (holding that the state had not succeeded in showing a compelling interest at trial). 
44 See infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
45 See  SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 37, at 137–48 (describing specific 
provisions of these statutes) 
46 See HAW. CONST., art. 1, § 23 (adopted 1998). 
47 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). 
48
 Id.  
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legislature soon responded by enacting a law creating the status of “civil 
unions,” with all the rights of marriage but not the name.49   
Same-sex marriage—with the name included—arrived when the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court decided in November 2003 that the state 
constitution was violated by the denial of marriage licenses to gay couples.  
The court held that there was no rational basis for this discrimination and 
gave the state six months to comply with its order.50  It later explained, in 
response to an inquiry from the legislature, that civil unions were 
inadequate because they “would have the effect of maintaining and 
fostering a stigma of exclusion that the Constitution prohibits.”51  
Massachusetts started issuing the licenses on May 17, 2004.52   
Other states have followed.  Four states and the District of Columbia have 
same-sex marriage, and five others have “civil unions” or “domestic 
partnerships” with all the same rights and responsibilities.  As this is 
written, nearly a quarter of the population of the United States lives in a 
jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex relationships as marriages or their 
functional equivalent.53  By the end of 2008, approximately 32,000 same-
                     
49
 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (granting parties to a civil 
union “all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they 
derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source 
of civil law, as are granted to a spouse in a marriage”).  
50 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–70 (Mass. 2003). 
51 In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004). 
52
 See Same-sex couples ready to make history in Massachusetts, CNN, May 17, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.gay.marriage/index.html. 
53
 Based on U.S. Census population figures for 2009:  United States, 307,006,550; 
Massachusetts, 6,593,587; Connecticut, 3,518,288; Iowa, 3,007,856; New Hampshire, 
1,324,575; Vermont, 621,760; District of Columbia, 599,657, California, 36,961,664; 
Nevada, 2,643,085; New Jersey, 8,707,739; Oregon, 3,825,657; Washington, 6,664,195.  
The first six of these call the relationships “marriage,” while the others use “domestic 
partnerships” or “civil unions.”  See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West 2004 & Supp. 
2010) (domestic partnership); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010–.510 (2009) (domestic 
partnership); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1–457-A:8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) 
(marriage); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1–26:8A-13 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (domestic 
partners); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28–37:1-36 (West Supp. 2009) (civil union); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.990 n.6 (West Supp. 2009) (domestic partnership); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 26.60.10–.901 (West Supp. 2010) (domestic partnership); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (marriage); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (marriage); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 
907 (Iowa 2009) (marriage); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
1004–05 (Mass. 2003) (marriage).  The eleven jurisdictions combined add up to 




sex couples had married in the United States, and 80,000 more were 
domestic partners, reciprocal beneficiaries, or united in civil unions.
54
  
That creates a situation that did not exist immediately after DOMA’s 
enactment:  a population of actual married couples, whose rights are 
adversely affected by the statute. 
 
B.  What DOMA Does 
 
 DOMA has two provisions.  The provision that has received the 
greatest amount of attention is the choice of law provision, which declares: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship.55 
Congress was afraid that, once same-sex marriages were recognized in 
Hawaii, other states would be required to recognize them, too.   
This provision displays all the sober good judgment of a 
Congressional initiative to ward off vampires.  The fears that prompted 
Congress to act were based upon a massive misunderstanding of existing 
law.  States have always had the power to decline to recognize marriages 
from other states, and they have been exercising that power for centuries. 
 The supporters of DOMA feared that recognition would be 
required by the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States 
Constitution.  That clause provides:  
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.56 
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Congress thought by invoking the last part of the provision, it could avoid 
the difficulty by prescribing that same-sex marriages need not have any 
effect. 
 Full faith and credit, however, only applies to judgments—
decisions of courts after adversarial litigation.  It has never been held to 
apply to marriage.  This provision of DOMA does have some effect, but 
the actual effects are so capricious as to be unconstitutional.  The statute 
may have no constitutional applications.  I have developed this argument 
elsewhere and will not repeat it here.57 
Although, when the bill was being debated, most of the press’s 
attention focused on the choice of law provision of DOMA—sometimes 
implying that it was the only substantive provision of the bill—the 
definitional provision was and is far more important.  It is the focus of 
Tauro’s, Reinhardt’s, and Kozinski’s opinions.  It provides: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” 
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.58 
Given the broad range of federal laws to which marital status is 
relevant, the consequences of DOMA are far-reaching.  Same-sex spouses 
may not file joint tax returns.59  Same-sex spouses’s debts incurred under 
divorce decrees or separation agreements would be dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.60  Same-sex spouses of federal employees are excluded from 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,61 the Federal Employees 
Group Life Insurance program,62 and the Federal Employees 
Compensation Act, which compensates the widow or widower of an 
employee killed in the performance of duty.63  Same-sex spouses are the 
only surviving widows and widowers who would not have automatic 
ownership rights in a copyrighted work after the author’s death.64  Same-
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sex spouses lack federal protection against enforcement of due-on-sale 
clauses, which allow a lender to declare the entire balance due and payable 
if mortgaged property is transferred, and which could compel the loss of 
the family home if the holder of the mortgage died and the spouse 
inherited the property.65  Same-sex spouses are denied the benefit of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which provides for up to twelve 
weeks per year of unpaid leave to employees for “care for a spouse.”66  
Same-sex spouses are similarly unable to receive benefits under the Social 
Security Act’s Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program.67  
Same-sex spouses are denied preferential treatment under immigration law 
and, therefore, are the only legally-married spouses of American citizens 
who face deportation.68 
 
C.  The Constitutional Puzzle of the Definitional Provision 
 
Is the definitional provision of DOMA constitutional?  Congress 
has the power to define the terms of the United States Code.  The only 
way to challenge this provision is to claim that it is impermissibly 
discriminatory.  All discrimination claims allege the abuse of a power that 
the actor concededly possesses.  Congress could not define “marriage” to 
mean only a legal union between persons of the same race.69  But the 
constitutional significance of discrimination against gays is uncertain.  The 
federal courts have been unwilling to give heightened scrutiny to laws that 
target gays, and the Supreme Court has not directly confronted the 
question.70  On one occasion, however, the Court did invalidate a law that 
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singled out gays for disadvantage. That is Romer, on which Tauro and 
Reinhardt rely heavily. 
DOMA’s definitional provision and the amendment invalidated in 
Romer have telling similarities.  Like the Colorado amendment, this 
provision “identifies persons by a single trait [membership in a same-sex 
marriage] and then denies them protection across the board.”
71  Congress 
does not seem to have given any specific consideration to the broad range 
of federal policies to which spousal status is relevant, or to have made any 
effort to justify the numerous specific disabilities that the statute imposed.  
For the first time in American history, DOMA created a set of second-
class marriages, valid under state law but void for all federal purposes.  
The exclusion of a class of valid state marriages from all federal 
recognition is “unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”
72
     
A defender of the statute could reply, however, that the disability it 
imposes, though broad, is proportionate to the situation that called it forth. 
DOMA’s definitions of “marriage” and “spouse,” the House committee 
report observed, “merely restate[] the current understanding of what those 
terms mean for purposes of federal law.”73  When Congress used the term 
“marriage” in the United States Code, it never imagined that this term 
would include same-sex couples.74  Hawaii’s adoption of same-sex 
marriage “would radically alter a basic premise upon which the 
presumption of adoption [for federal purposes] of state domestic relations 
law was based— namely, the essential fungibility of the concepts of 
‘marriage’ from one state to another.”75  This provision of DOMA, then, 
merely reaffirms “what is already known, what is already in place.”76  It is 
hard to see how a law that simply declares the status quo can be 
unconstitutionally discriminatory. 
The Romer analogy does not necessarily devastate DOMA because 
there are significant disanalogies as well.  Unlike Amendment 2, this law 
does not “outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be 
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  Amendment 2’s license to discriminate against gays was 
so broadly worded that it seemed to the Court likely to mandate some 
unconstitutional applications.78  That fact bespoke a bare desire to harm 
gays.  However, there is no fundamental right to file a joint tax return or to 
receive social security benefits.  The discrimination against same-sex 
couples may be unprecedented, a defender of DOMA could say, but so is 
the situation that called forth the law.  If there is any positive value to the 
tradition of restricting marriage to one man and one woman, then this 
positive value provides a rational basis for DOMA.  One cannot 
confidently infer, simply by considering the definitional provision on its 
face, that its purpose is a desire to harm the group.  That might be the 
purpose, but an innocent explanation is available.  The Court has often 
been prone to credit innocent explanations of statutes, even those that 
harm constitutionally-protected groups.79  In order for the law to be 
invalidated, there has to be some reason to disbelieve that explanation. 
The statute’s targeting of gays, and the uniqueness of the disability 
imposed, provide some of the needed evidence of invidious purpose:  
“[l]aws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status . . 
. are rare,”
80 and “‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially 
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to 
the constitutional provision.’”81  But where is this “careful consideration” 
to lead?  Romer relied— how heavily?— on the fact that no innocent 
explanation of the statute seemed even facially plausible.82  The Court’s 
opinion does not indicate what should be done if the state is able to proffer 
such an innocent explanation.   
I once wrote, on the basis of the reasoning just stated, that “an 
equal protection challenge to the definitional provision of DOMA, 
standing alone, would be a hard case.”
83
  I recant, disavow what I wrote, 
and repent.  It is not such a hard case any more.  I think GLAD has a 
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pretty good chance of winning its suit.  The culture has shifted, in ways 
that I had not anticipated. 
 
III. THE CHANGING CULTURAL CONTEXT 
 
Gay rights claims of all kinds became more politically potent in the 
1980s, largely as a consequence of the willingness of unprecedented 
numbers of gay people to come out to their friends, families, and 
coworkers.  In 1985, only a quarter of Americans reported having a gay 
friend, relative, or coworker.84  By 2000, that proportion had tripled, to 
three-quarters of the population.85  Only a fifth said they did not know 
anyone gay.86  The number who reported having a gay friend or close 
acquaintance rose from twenty-two percent in 1985 to fifty-six percent by 
2000.87  Those reporting a gay or lesbian family member rose from nine 
percent in 1992 to twenty-three percent in 2000.88  Gay people were 
increasingly visible, and their claims were the claims of familiar human 
beings, not distant abstractions. 
Pressure for recognition of same-sex relationships increased during 
the 1980s, historian George Chauncey observes, because of the impact of 
two new developments in that period:  the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian 
baby boom.89  AIDS victims often had to rely on the assistance of 
partners who were regarded by the law as legal strangers to them.90  
“Because they were not ‘next of kin,’ hospitals could refuse them the right 
to visit their partners, did not need to consult with them or even inform 
them about treatment, and could not designate them to sign forms 
authorizing medical treatments even if they wanted to.”91  A surviving 
partner sometimes lost his home when his partner’s biological family 
contested his will or claimed a jointly-owned home or property.92  The 
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willingness of some courts to set aside wills of gay testators sometimes led 
partners to settle for a fraction of their inheritance.93   
At the same time, increasing numbers of lesbian couples were 
having children, typically through the use of donor sperm.94  They 
worried about what would happen if the biological mother died and a 
relative contested the right of the surviving partner to continue to have a 
relationship with the child.95  Difficulties also arose when a couple 
separated after one had given birth to a child who both had raised.96  The 
nonbiological mother had no legal relationship with the child and no right 
to visitation, and the biological mother had no claim for child support.97   
As horror stories accumulated, “more couples hired lawyers to 
prepare wills, medical powers of attorney, and other documents to provide 
them with some security.”98  But a complete set of documents 
approximating the protections of marriage could cost thousands of dollars, 
more than many couples could afford.99  And, as noted earlier, some 
benefits of marriage could not be achieved by any contract between the 
parties.100  So gay couples began to campaign for some recognition of 
their relationship under the rubric of “domestic partnerships.”101  
Avoiding the term “marriage” made sense, since the experience of 
unsuccessful litigation in the 1970s and 1980s had made it clear that same-
sex marriage was not, even distantly, on the political horizon.102 
Then came Hawaii— and I have already told you the rest of that 
story.103  Pressure for recognition has only increased since then.104 
 Public opinion is making marriage recognition inevitable.  
According to Gallup, 57% of Americans oppose same-sex marriage.105  
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There is a sharp generational divide, however.  Opponents of same-sex 
marriage have been spectacularly unsuccessful at passing their attitudes on 
to their children.  Among those 18 to 34 years old, 58% support same-sex 
marriages.106  Support for same-sex marriage drops to 42%  among 
respondents 35 to 49 years old, to 41% of those 50 to 64 years old, and 
only 24% of those aged 65 and older.107  The effect is even noticeable 
among white evangelical Christians, otherwise a very conservative lot:  
32% of 18 to 29 year old white evanglical Christians support some legal 
recognition of same-sex couples, with an additional 26% supporting 
marriage rights. 108  In other words, 58% of white young evangelical 
Christians support at least some legal recognition of same-sex couples.109  
Of white evangelical Christians 30  and older, 37% support some legal 
recognition of same-sex couples, and an additional 9% support full same-
sex marriage rights—a total of only 46% of older white evangelical 
Christians who support any legal recognition of same-sex couples.110  
Older evangelicals also care much more about the issue:  according to a 
Pew Forum study, 61.8% of white evangelical Christians over age 60 said 
that “stopping gay marriage” was very important, while only 34% of white 
evangelical Christians 29 and younger said so.111  The case against same-
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sex marriage has become increasingly unintelligible.112  That obviously 
will have implications when courts go looking for a rational basis for laws 
that discriminate against gay people. 
IV.  THE CONSTITUTION LIVES! 
 
All this affects the shape of constitutional law.  What constrains 
constitutional law is not a set of rules, but a set of rhetorical norms, 
themselves unstable and shifting over time, that determine which moves 
are legitimate.  Richard Posner has observed that “‘thinking like a 
lawyer’” really means “an awareness of approximately how plastic law is 
at the frontiers—neither infinitely plastic . . . nor rigid and predetermined, 
as many laypersons think.”113   
Jack Balkin emphasizes the way in which the boundaries of 
legitimate constitutional argument shift as culture does, so that an 
argument regarded as crackpot and “off the wall” at one time becomes 
accepted doctrine later on.114  Balkin also observes that, because 
constitutional law is in some respects hostage to cultural shifts, social 
movements, such as the Civil Rights movement or, more recently, the 
movement for gun rights, can change the shape of constitutional law. 
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In practice the meaning of constitutional principles shifts over 
time.  Some constitutional terms, such as “equal protection,” are 
intentionally abstract, leaving the specification to be worked out by later 
generations.  Mobilized social movements, invoking their own 
interpretations of those texts, play a legitimate role in determining which 
specification will ultimately prevail.115  The constitutional protection of 
sex equality, for example, is the consequence of the feminist movement of 
the 1970s, which changed the mind of the public in a way that eventually 
was reflected in the interpretation of the Constitution.116  The triumph of 
gun rights in District of Columbia v. Heller117 is another example.118 
The idea that social movements shape constitutional law has been 
particularly distressing to many originalists, who are committed to the idea 
that the Constitution’s meaning does not shift over time.119  John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport write, “it is a little difficult to see what 
is left of a recognizable originalism, not to mention the amendment 
process, if social movements have such substantial discretion to apply 
constitutional provisions as they see fit.”120  Steven Calabresi and Livia 
Fine claim that Balkin’s originalism “substitutes the rule of engaged social 
movements for the rule of law.”121 
 These charges draw blood only if there is a feasible alternative to 
the world contemplated by Balkin—an originalism that purges 
adjudication of discretion and the vagaries of political change. 
Balkin’s argument is both descriptive and normative.  The 
descriptive part is an account of how constitutional interpretation is done 
in the United States—how constitutional interpreters in this culture make 
their way from the spectacularly vague commands of “equal protection” 
and “due process” to determinate legal outcomes.  The normative part 
pronounces this process good.  Like so many liberal legal theorists in the 
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age of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, Balkin is a stodgy defender of 
the status quo. 
Originalists are unhappy with the way that constitutional law 
actually operates.  They propose to scrap it, and replace it with a new and 
untested theory.  They are the real radicals.  Their unhappiness with the 
regime as it actually operates, and has operated throughout American 





V.  THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT LIVES, TOO 
 
As our culture evolves, it may even become possible for courts to 
notice the constitutional difficulty with DOMA that is hiding in plain 
sight:  the fact it makes one’s rights under federal law turn on one’s 
gender. 
This is exactly the situation that the Court faced in the earliest sex 
discrimination cases.  Frontiero v. Richardson invalidated a law that 
automatically allowed male members of the Air Force to claim their wives 
as a dependent and therefore receive housing and medical benefits, but 
required female members to prove that their husbands depended on them 
for more than half their support.
123
  If Sharron Frontiero had been male, 
she would have gotten the benefits.124  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld struck 
down a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a widowed 
mother, but not a widowed father, to receive survivor’s benefits based on 
the earnings of the deceased spouse.
125
  If Stephen Wiesenfeld had been 
female, he would have gotten the benefits he was denied.126 
The GLAD lawsuit and the two Ninth Circuit cases present exactly 
the same situation.127  In each case, had the spouse been of a different 
sex, the benefits would automatically have been granted.  For example, 
Congressman Studds’s widower, Dean Hara, is disqualified for a federal 
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pension because he is a man.  If he were a woman, the problem would 
disappear.   
All discrimination against gays is a kind of sex discrimination.  I 
have stated and defended this argument many times before, and will not 
repeat it all here.
128
  I will, however, respond to one criticism of my 
argument recently made by Martha Nussbaum. 
Nussbaum argues that it is true that “wherever a change of a male 
to a female or a female to a male makes a decisive legal difference, that 
law involves a classification based upon sex, and such classifications 
deserve heightened scrutiny.”
129
  But she objects that this argument 
“seems legalistic in the pejorative sense,” because “it doesn’t quite get at 
what is really going on;” it “doesn’t reach deeply enough to get at the real 
source of the discrimination.”
130
  Antigay discrimination is about sexual 
orientation, not about sex. 
My argument does not, however, purport to be a complete 
explanation of where the discrimination is coming from.  Rather, it claims 
that sex discrimination is one of the many wrongs present in antigay 
discrimination.
131
  Nussbaum’s objection mistakes a complaint for an 
explanation. I am not attempting to explain antigay discrimination.  I am 
complaining that certain laws violate a specific constitutional prohibition.   
Another way of reading Nussbaum’s objection is that the sex 
discrimination identifies a wrong, but not the most morally-salient wrong.  
It is like saying that Al Capone, the notorious 1920s bootlegger who 
ordered the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre, was guilty of tax evasion.  This 
is a strange way to characterize the totality of his misconduct.  On the 
other hand, if we are doing a legal rather than a moral analysis, the tax 
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evasion charge is accurate:  whatever else he is guilty of, he certainly is 
guilty of that.  (Tax evasion is what Capone was eventually convicted of.)  
Similarly with the sex discrimination argument:  whatever the other 
constitutional difficulties with DOMA, it certainly discriminates on the 
basis of sex. 
I would also argue that my complaint is not “legalistic in the 
pejorative sense,” because there are deep links—not fully explanatory 
links, but nonetheless deep enough that this is not just a lawyer’s trick - 
between sexism and heterosexism. 
When I developed the sex discrimination argument in a 1994 
article, I emphasized that the argument does not depend on any claim 
about the connection between heterosexism and sexism.
132
  I went on to 
develop such a claim, however, because I recognized that judges might 
wonder whether the protection of gays is consistent with the purposes of 
sex discrimination doctrine.133  The answer depends on what one thinks 
sex discrimination law is for.  If the purpose is to prevent the imposition of 
gender classifications on people’s life choices, then the argument is over; 
this is just what the formal argument shows that antigay discrimination 
does.
134
  If, however, one thinks that sex discrimination law exists in order 
to end the subordination of women, then one would have to demonstrate 
some link between antigay discrimination and the subordination of 
women.  For this reason, I argued at some length that sexism is an 
important wellspring of antigay animus, and that the homosexuality taboo 
functions to strengthen gender hierarchy.
135   
The point is not an esoteric one.  Most Americans learn no later 
than high school that one of the nastier sanctions that one will suffer if one 
deviates from the behavior traditionally deemed appropriate for one’s sex is 
the imputation of homosexuality.  The two stigmas—sex-inappropriateness 
and homosexuality—are virtually interchangeable, and each is readily used 
as a metaphor for the other.   
 To the extent I am relying on an explanation of homophobia, 
Nussbaum makes the mechanism sound too conscious when she describes 
it as “a way of maintaining binary divisions of the sexes and the 
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patriarchal control of men over women.”
136  Rather, I am offering a story 
about maintenance of gender identity—one that is not all that different 
from the one about disgust toward markers of the mortal body that 
Nussbaum tells.137  She argues, against the sex discrimination argument, 
that prejudice against gay men draws centrally upon “profound anxieties 
about bodily penetrability and vulnerability (anxieties that are felt, above 
all, by men).”
138  Is that not about maintaining gender hierarchy?  Does 
this anxiety not presuppose that there are certain people whose 
penetrability, construed as subordination, is perfectly acceptable, and that 
it is urgently important not to be one of those people? 
 The deeper problem, as a matter of law, with jumping straight to 
the claim that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, as Nussbaum 
wishes to do, is that most of the laws that hurt gay people do not classify 
on the basis of sexual orientation.  The law in Romer did, but it was an 
outlier.  Even the law in Lawrence v. Texas, which specifically 
criminalized homosexual sex, did not require any state official formally to 
treat gay people differently from heterosexuals.139  It just demanded to 
know the gender of the participants in the sex act.  Similarly with laws that 
restrict marriage to heterosexual couples.140 
The formalism here is not mine.  It is intrinsic to the Supreme 
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, which was well-suited to deal 
with Jim Crow (which was full of formal race discriminations; the law 
needed to know what race you were in order to decide whether you could 
drink out of that fountain), but is less suited to deal with any law that 
subordinates groups but does not formally classify by sex.  Disparate 
impact does not count unless it is motivated by a malicious desire to hurt 
the affected group (which is very hard to prove).
141  Given the law’s focus 
on classification, which is not going away any time soon, we are probably 
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going to need the sex discrimination argument even if courts accept that 
sexual orientation is a suspect classification. 
Courts have summarily rejected the sex discrimination argument, 
frequently on the basis of the very sex stereotypes that sex discrimination 
law aims to eradicate.142  Why does the logic of the sex discrimination 
argument not prevail?  To say it once more, the bounds of legitimate legal 
argument are not set by rules, but by custom and usage.  The sex 
discrimination argument proves too much:  if it is accepted, the acceptance 
of same-sex marriage automatically follows, and courts resisted that 
conclusion as politically impossible.  Now that same-sex marriage is 





The cultural shift I have been discussing also affects interest 
analysis in choice of law.  Choice of law today is dominated by what is 
called “interest analysis,” which tries to balance the legitimate interests—
both territorial and personal—of different states in having their own laws 
apply.143  In order to apply it in a case where it is not clear which state’s 
marriage laws apply, one must determine what the legitimate state 
interests are.   
In my own analysis of choice of law and same-sex marriage, I have 
had to stipulate for the sake of the argument what I do not really believe, 
that states have a legitimate interest in denying same-sex couples the right 
to marry.144  But those interests are likely to shrink.  As Tobias Wolff has 
pointed out, after Lawrence v. Texas,
145
 any purported interest in 
excluding gay couples from a state’s borders is illegimate.
146
  Lawrence 
and Romer together indicate that expression of moral disapproval, without 
more, is not a sufficient reason for denying equal treatment to same-sex 
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couples.147  Saenz v. Roe indicates that a state may not structure its legal 
entitlements for the specific purpose of dissuading people from migrating 
to its borders.148   
This leaves some, but not a great many, legitimate interests that 
states can invoke.  For all the reasons already canvassed, these are likely 
to make less and less sense to judges.  The time is coming when I will no 
longer have to stick to my stipulation in order to be able to address the 
choice of law issues presented by same-sex marriage. 
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